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Most	   decisions	   are	   taken	   in	   group	   contexts	   where	   one	   person’s	   behavior	   is	   affected	   by	   others.	   We	  
explore	  drivers	  of	  coordination	  in	  Rural	  Producer	  Organizations	  (RPOs)	  of	  groundnut	  farmers	  in	  Senegal.	  
We	   conduct	   a	   randomized	   controlled	   trial	   motivated	   by	   a	   theoretical	   model,	   where	   we	   varied	   the	  
number	   and	   type	   of	   individuals	   invited	   to	   a	   training	   on	   collective	   commercialization.	   We	   use	   this	  
variation	  to	  identify	  effects	  on	  subsequent	  commercialization	  behavior	  of	  members	  who	  did	  not	  attend	  
the	  training.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  non-­‐trained	  individuals	  are	  likely	  to	  sell	  more	  through	  the	  group	  if	  
a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  group	  leaders	  attended	  the	  training.	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Over	   the	   past	   decade,	   Rural	   Producer	   Organisations	   (RPOs)	   such	   as	   cooperatives	   have	   received	  
increased	   support	   from	  the	  development	  community	  as	  a	  means	   to	  provide	   smallholder	   farmers	  with	  
better	  access	  to	   input	  and	  output	  markets	  (World	  Bank	  2008,	  Uphoff	  1993,	  Rondot	  and	  Collion	  2001).	  
Collective	   action	   is	   often	   thought	   of	   as	   an	   effective	  means	   to	   reduce	   transaction	   costs	   in	   conditions	  
where	  commercialization	  is	  characterized	  by	  important	  economies	  of	  scale	  (Berdégué	  2001,	  Poulton	  et	  
al.	  2010).	  Such	  organizations	  have	   indeed	  played	  a	  major	   role	   in	   the	  successful	  performance	  of	   family	  
farms	   in	   today’s	   richer	   countries	   (Malassis,	   2000).	   Cooperatives	   currently	   account	   for	   60%	   of	  
commercialized	   agricultural	   outputs	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   (Mercoiret,	   Pesche	   and	   Bosc,	   2006).	  
Successful	  examples	   in	  developing	   countries	   include	   Indian	  dairy	  and	   	  Colombian	  coffee	   cooperatives,	  
facilitating	   market	   access	   for,	   respectively,	   12	   million	   and	   300,000	   small-­‐scale	   producers.	   Yet,	   many	  
organizations	   in	  developing	  countries	  still	   struggle	  to	  offer	   the	  type	  of	  commercialization	  services	   that	  
could	   potentially	   lead	   to	   higher	   output	   prices	   for	   their	   members	   (e.g.	   Fafchamps	   and	   Hill	   2005	   in	  
Uganda,	  Bernard	  et	  al.	  2008	   in	  Senegal	  and	  Burkina	  Faso,	  Bernard	  et	  al.	  2010	   in	  Ethiopia,	  Ragasa	  and	  
Golan	  2013	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo).	  	  
To	  explain	  this	  limited	  capacity,	  one	  strand	  of	  the	  literature	  has	  highlighted	  factors	  such	  as	  size	  
and	   heterogeneity	   as	  well	   as	   unfavorable	   institutional	   and	  market	   environments	   (Coulter	   et	   al.	   1999,	  
Markelova	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Several	  studies	  note	  that	  small	  and	  relatively	  homogeneous	  organizations	  often	  
fail	   to	   engage	   in	   such	   activities,	   even	   when	   returns	   are	   potentially	   high	   (Fafchamps	   and	   Hill	   2005,	  
Bernard	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Another	   strand	   of	   	   literature	   investigates	   the	   issue	   of	  member	   commitment	   to	  
reach	  the	  type	  of	  product	  aggregation	  necessary	  for	  successful	  collective	  commercialization	  (e.g.	  Hill	  and	  
Maruyama	   2013,	   Bernard	   and	   Seyoum-­‐Taffesse	   2012).	   As	   put	   by	   a	   member	   of	   a	   groundnut	   RPO	   	   in	  
Senegal	   	   “[larger	   buyers]	   only	   come	   for	   large	   enough	   quantities”.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   sufficient	  
commitment	  of	  members	  to	  commercialize	  collectively,	  the	  efforts	  of	  RPOs	  to	  effectively	  obtain	  higher	  
prices	  will	  fail,	  further	  contributing	  to	  the	  low	  commitment	  of	  members	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
In	   this	   paper,	   we	   focus	   on	   two	   main	   aspects	   that	   primarily	   fall	   in	   this	   second	   strand	   of	   the	  
literature.	   First,	   we	   argue	   that	   coordination	   issues	   between	   members	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration.	   In	   line	   with	   standard	   stag-­‐hunt	   coordination	   games,	   we	   postulate	   that	   an	   individual’s	  
belief	   concerning	   the	  minimum	  number	  of	  other	  members	  who	  are	   committed	   to	   selling	   through	   the	  
organization	   will	   affect	   the	   expected	   benefits	   from	   collective	   commercialization	   and	   thereby	   this	  
individual’s	   decision	   to	   sell	   through	   the	   RPO.	   In	   such	   games,	   with	   rational	   individuals	   and	   imperfect	  
information	  regarding	  the	  behavior	  of	  others,	  coordination	  failure	  is	  often	  predicted	  (e.g.	  Van	  Huyck	  et	  
al.	  1990,	  or	  Morris	  and	  Shin	  2003).	  Even	  where	  there	  is	  a	  payoff-­‐dominant	  coordination	  equilibrium	  that	  
may	  be	  preferred	  by	  all,	  an	   individual	  player	  may	  choose	  not	  to	  coordinate	  given	  strategic	  uncertainty	  
about	  the	  actions	  or	  beliefs	  of	  others.	  	  
Such	  coordination	  failure	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  data	  from	  27	  groundnut	  RPOs	  in	  Senegal.	  	  Most	  
producers	   sell	   their	   output	   individually	   and	   point	   to	   important	   difficulties	  when	   dealing	  with	   traders,	  
partly	  related	  to	  issues	  of	   local	  monopsony,	  collusion,	  failure	  to	  pay,	  and	  asymmetric	   information	  with	  
respect	   to	   quality-­‐related	   issues.	   While	   members	   believe	   that	   collective	   commercialization	   has	   the	  
potential	  to	  solve	  these	  issues,	  their	   limited	  involvement	  in	  collective	  commercialization	  appears	  to	  be	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significantly	   correlated	   with	   their	   aversion	   to	   strategic	   uncertainty	   as	   measured	   by	   an	   experimental	  
instrument	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Heinemann	  et	  al.	  (2009).1	  
Second,	  we	  investigate	  some	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  coordination	  towards	  more	  collective	  
commercialization	  may	  be	  enhanced.	  Leadership	  has	  often	  been	  emphasized	  as	  the	  means	  to	  enhance	  
coordination	  because	  of	   (1)	   leaders’	   privileged	  access	   to	   information	   (see	   for	   example	  Hermalin	  1998	  
and	  Potters	  et	  al.	  2007),	  (2)	  leaders’	  	  methods	  to	  lead	  by	  example	  or	  sacrifice	  (see	  same	  references)	  or	  
(3)	   leaders’	   actions	   being	  more	   visible	   by	   others	   (see	   for	   example	  Acemoglu	   and	   Jackson,	   2011).	   Yet,	  
others	   have	   argued	   that	   too	   much	   emphasis	   is	   being	   placed	   on	   leaders	   as	   opposed	   to	   interactions	  
between	   regular	  members,	   leading	   to	   so-­‐called	   ‘leadership	   attribution	  error	  or	   bias’	   (see	   for	   example	  
Hackman	  and	  Wageman	  2005	  and	  Majumdar	  and	  Mukand	  2008).	  Lastly,	  a	  significant	   literature	   largely	  
based	  on	  Granovetter	  (1978)	  argues	  that,	  independent	  of	  leadership	  issues,	  critical	  mass	  is	  necessary	  to	  
achieve	  coordination.	  
	  We	   assess	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   these	   mechanisms	   using	   a	   randomized	   training	  
intervention	  aimed	  at	  enhancing	  collective	  commercialization.	  The	  training	  itself	  consisted	  of	  three	  days	  
of	   interactive	   discussion	   on	   the	   benefits,	   conduct	   and	   constraints	   associated	   with	   collective	  
commercialization	   and	   was	   administered	   in	   collaboration	   with	   GRET	   (a	   French	   NGO),	   PINORD	   (a	  
Senegalese	  NGO)	   and	   the	   two	   cooperative	   federations	   to	  which	   the	   27	   village-­‐level	   RPOs	  mentioned	  
above	  belong.	  All	  RPOs	  had	  stated	  collective	  commercialization	  as	  one	  of	  their	  main	  objectives	  though	  
they	  mentioned	  facing	  important	  difficulties	  in	  aggregating	  their	  members’	  produce.2	  	  
In	  each	  selected	  organization	  we	  randomly	  varied	  the	  number	  of	  regular	  members	  and	  leaders	  
(members	  of	  the	  management	  committee)	  invited	  to	  the	  training.3	  This	  enables	  us	  to	  assess	  the	  effect	  of	  
training	   on	   member	   engagement	   in	   collective	   commercialization	   through	   three	   complementary	  
treatments:	   (i)	   whether	   or	   not	   an	   organization	   was	   selected	   for	   training;	   (ii)	   the	   total	   number	   of	  
members	   of	   an	   organization	   invited	   to	   the	   training	   and	   (iii)	   the	   number	   of	   regular	   members	   versus	  
leaders	   that	  were	   invited.4	   According	   to	  measures	   of	   strategic	   uncertainty	   collected	   both	   before	   and	  
shortly	   after	   training,	   all	   trained	   individuals	   displayed	   strong	   improvement	   –	   reaching	   the	   maximum	  
possible	  score	  –	  in	  their	  intentions	  to	  engage	  into	  collective	  commercialization.	  	  
We	  also	  assess	  how	  differences	  in	  the	  number	  and	  type	  of	  members	  trained	  affect	  the	  behavior	  	  
of	  a	  sample	  of	  randomly	  chosen	  individuals	  in	  each	  organization	  who	  were	  not	  themselves	  invited	  to	  the	  
training.	   For	   these	   individuals,	   our	   main	   outcome	   variable	   is	   the	   total	   quantity	   of	   groundnuts	  
contributed	   to	   the	  organization’s	   collective	   commercialization	  effort	   in	   the	  nine	  months	   following	  our	  
intervention.	   In	   all	   treated	   RPOs,	   a	   general	   assembly	   was	   convened	   shortly	   after	   training	   to	   discuss	  
training	  content	  with	  non-­‐participants	  such	  that	  any	  differential	  effects	  of	  treatments	  (ii)	  and	  (iii)	  cannot	  
be	  attributed	  to	  information	  about	  the	  training	  itself	  and	  are	  interpreted	  as	  related	  to	  changes	  in	  beliefs	  
about	  the	  commitment	  of	  other	  members.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   For	   comparison	   purposes,	   no	   such	   correlation	   is	   found	   with	   similar	   indicators	   that	   measure	   risk	   aversion,	  
preference	  for	  present,	  and	  altruism	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  group	  members.	  
2	  The	  initial	  design	  included	  another	  series	  of	  onion-­‐	  and	  rice-­‐related	  RPOs.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  these	  organizations	  are	  
not	  involved	  in	  collective	  commercialization	  and	  thus,	  they	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  
3	  These	  individuals	  were	  themselves	  randomly	  selected	  from	  an	  initial	  list	  of	  members	  and	  leaders.	  
4	  Leaders	  include	  all	  individuals	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  RPO’s	  management	  committee.	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Our	   results	   show	   statistically	   significant	   evidence	   that	   training	   led	   to	   higher	   collective	  
commercialization	   of	   output	   in	   those	   organizations	   randomly	   selected	   to	   have	   at	   least	   one	   individual	  
trained.	  Further,	  we	  find	  that	  this	  effect	   is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  number	  of	   leaders	  selected	  to	  attend	  the	  
training,	   beyond	   the	   total	   number	   of	   individuals	   trained.	   Training	   	   one	   of	   the	   leaders,	   or	   the	   actual	  
chairman	   of	   the	   RPO,	   is	   not	   associated	   with	   such	   increased	   effects	   of	   training	   onto	   collective	  
commercialization.	  Laslty,	  we	  do	  not	  uncover	  evidence	  that	  trust-­‐level	  or	  available	  quantity	  of	  output	  to	  
be	  commercialized	  help	  explain	  these	  results.	  	  	  
	   This	  paper	  contributes	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  our	  results	  support	  a	  rather	  
mixed	   story	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   theoretical	   literature.	   In	   line	  with	   Hermalin	   (1998)	   or	   Acemoglu	   and	  
Jackson	  (2011),	  we	  do	  find	  that	  leaders	  exert	  a	  stronger	  influence	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  regular	  members	  
compared	  to	  member-­‐to-­‐member	  influence.	  Yet,	  a	  single	  leader	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  trigger	  a	  large	  
enough	   change	   in	   other	   members’	   beliefs	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   potential	   benefits	   of	   collective	  
commercialization.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  literature	  has	  mostly	  focused	  on	  leadership	  as	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  
single	   individual,	   our	   results	   point	   to	   a	  more	  nuanced	   story,	   according	   to	  which	   leadership	   should	  be	  
seen	   as	   exercised	   by	   a	   pool	   of	   individuals.	   Second,	   from	   a	   methodological	   perspective,	   we	   study	  
coordination	  issues	  within	  existing	  organizations	  using	  both	  a	  randomized	  controlled	  trial	  and	  a	   lablike	  
experimental	  measure	  of	  strategic	  uncertainty.	  This	  enables	  us	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  strand	  of	  literature	  
that	   has	   argued	   generalizability	   of	   lab-­‐in-­‐the-­‐field	   measures	   (in	   this	   case,	   perceptions/beliefs	   about	  
strategic	   uncertainty)	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   corresponding	   real-­‐life	   behavioral	   outcomes	   in	   the	   form	   of	   collective	  
commercialization	  (see	  Camerer	  2011	  for	  a	  review).	  Our	  results	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  small	  but	  growing	  
empirical	  literature	  attempting	  to	  identify	  spillover	  effects	  from	  variation	  in	  treatment	  intensities	  within	  
groups	   (see	  Baird	  et	  al.	  2012	   for	  a	   review	  and	  methodological	  discussion).	   In	  our	  case,	   spillovers	  arise	  
from	  strategic	  complementarity	  in	  joint	  actions.	  
The	   remainder	  of	   the	  paper	   is	  organized	  as	   follows.	   In	  Section	  2,	  we	  provide	  some	  contextual	  
background	  on	  commercialization	  and	  the	  role	  of	  RPOs	  in	  the	  Senegalese	  groundnut	  sector.	  In	  Section	  3,	  
we	   use	   a	   lablike	   experimental	   measure	   for	   strategic	   uncertainty	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   past	  
commercialization	   behavior	   to	   motivate	   our	   focus	   on	   coordination	   issues	   in	   explaining	   cooperatives’	  
limited	   success	   in	   collective	   commercialization.	   Section	   4	   posits	   a	   simple	   model	   of	   coordination	   and	  
strategic	  uncertainty	   applied	   to	   this	   context.	   In	   Section	  5,	  we	  present	  details	  on	   the	  experiments	   and	  
data	  alongside	  tests	  of	  experimental	  integrity	  (internal	  validity).	  Section	  6	  discusses	  the	  results.	  Finally,	  




Groundnut	  production	  has	  long	  constituted	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  Senegalese	  economy.	  At	  independence,	  
the	  sector	  employed	  87%	  of	  the	  active	  population	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  took	  up	  half	  of	  the	  cultivated	  land.	  
Groundnut	  processing	  contributed	  to	  42%	  of	  all	  industrial	  output	  and	  groundnuts	  represented	  80%	  of	  all	  
export	  revenues	  (Caswell,	  1984).	  Similar	  to	  other	  cash	  crops	  in	  West	  Africa,	  the	  entire	  value	  chain	  was	  
organized	  and	  controlled	  by	  state	  entities	  in	  charge	  of	  providing	  extension,	  inputs	  and	  credit	  to	  farmers	  
as	  well	  as	  collecting,	  processing	  and	  exporting	  output.	  The	  groundnut	  sector	  is	  said	  to	  have	  contributed	  
to	   the	   modernization	   of	   Senegalese	   agriculture,	   promoting	   innovations	   such	   as	   inorganic	   fertilizer	  
application,	   animal	   traction	   and	   other	   farm	   technologies	   (Faye,	   2005).	   Over	   time,	   however,	   revenues	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from	  the	  sector	  steadily	  declined	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  external	  factors	  such	  as	  lower	  international	  
prices,	   the	   abolishment	   of	   preferential	   tariffs	   to	   the	   French	  market	   (1972),	   droughts	   (1969-­‐1973),	   oil	  
shocks	   (1973	   and	   1979),	   exchange	   rate	   devaluation	   (1994)	   and	   internal	   factors	   related	   to	  
mismanagement	   and	   political	   considerations	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   the	   value	   chain.	   These	   resulted	   in	  
several	  attempts	  to	  reform	  the	  sector,	  which	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  culminated	  in	  the	  gradual	  privatization	  of	  
all	  segments	  of	  the	  groundnut	  value	  chain.	  	  
	   At	  the	  producer-­‐level	  the	  most	   important	  reform	  occurred	  in	  2001	  with	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  
parastatal	  (SONACOS)	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  input	  provision	  and	  output	  collection	  through	  a	  dense	  network	  of	  
producer	  cooperatives.	  Although	  privatized,	  the	  principal	  end-­‐buyer	  of	  groundnuts,	  now	  named	  Suneor,	  
still	   exists,	   but	   procures	   groundnuts	   through	   a	   system	   called	   “carreau-­‐usine”	   in	  which	   private	   traders	  
and	  collectors	  are	  ensured	  a	  fixed	  price	  upon	  delivery	  at	  the	  processing	  plant.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  
fixed	  and	  unique	  producer-­‐level	  price	  that	  had	  existed	  before.	  Following	  the	  reforms,	  competitive	  forces	  
were	  expected	  to	  support	  producer	  prices	  but	  issues	  of	  local	  monopsony,	  collusion,	  failure	  to	  pay,	  and	  
asymmetric	  information	  with	  respect	  to	  quality-­‐related	  issues	  has	  led	  to	  general	  dissatisfaction	  with	  this	  
new	  system.	   In	   the	   last	  evolution	   to	  date	   in	  2010,	   the	  export	  monopoly	  previously	  granted	   to	  Suneor	  
was	  abolished,	  facilitating	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  international	  players	  that	  procure	  groundnuts	  directly	  from	  
producers	   via	   a	   new	   network	   of	   collection	   points.	   During	   the	   2012	   season,	   prices	   offered	   by	   these	  
newcomers	   significantly	   surpassed	   those	   offered	   by	   Suneor,	   further	   weakening	   what	   remains	   of	   the	  
former	  system.	  	  
Following	   these	   reforms,	   the	   role,	   functioning	   and	   capacity	   of	   what	   were	   initially	   producer	  
cooperatives	   significantly	   changed.	   Formed	   and	   controlled	   by	   parastatal	   organizations,	   these	  
cooperatives	  evolved	  towards	  independent	  member-­‐controlled	  entities	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  various	  
kinds	  of	  partners.	  Through	  membership	  of	  federations,	  these	  organizations	  have	  sometimes	  been	  able	  
to	  better	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  members	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  former,	  state-­‐controlled	  system.	  
Yet,	   as	   they	   are	   no	   longer	   the	   only	   service	   provider,	   these	   RPOs	   face	   new	   challenges	   in	   ensuring	   the	  
commitment	  of	  members.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  activities	  related	  to	  collective	  commercialization	  of	  
output.	   In	   fact,	   while	   RPOs	   remain	   active	   in	   input	   and	   credit	   provision,	   their	   capacity	   to	   aggregate	  
output	   has	   considerably	   weakened.	   At	   harvest	   time,	   member-­‐farmers	   are	   now	   visited	   by	   private	  
collectors	  and	  traders	  (Banabanas)	  offering	  an	  immediate	  cash	  payment.	  This	  has	  led	  to	  important	  side-­‐
selling	  implying	  that	  a	  large	  share	  of	  produce	  is	  not	  marketed	  through	  the	  organization.	  As	  a	  result,	  RPOs	  
are	   seldom	   able	   to	   aggregate	   the	   necessary	   amount	   of	   groundnuts	   that	   would	   effectively	   trigger	  
economies	   of	   scale	   and	   bargaining	   power	   at	   time	   of	   commercialization.	   This	   is	   despite	   evidence	   that	  
groundnut	   RPOs	   in	   Senegal	   can,	   in	   fact,	   provide	   their	   members	   with	   profitable	   and	   reliable	   output	  
commercialization	   services	   (for	   example,	   Vandercam	   2005).	   To	   reiterate,	   if	   they	   are	   not	   able	   to	  
aggregate	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  produce,	  RPOs	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  effectively	  obtain	  higher	  output	  
prices	   further	   contributing	   to	   side-­‐selling	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   interest	   of	   members	   in	   commercialization	  
services	  offered	  by	  the	  organization.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  RPOs	  seldom	  enforce	  any	  sanctions	  against	  members	  who	  engage	  in	  side-­‐selling.	  In	  
effect,	  no	  formal	  contract	  is	  established	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  court	  of	  law.	  Further,	  as	  they	  are	  located	  
within	   villages	  with	   dense	   family	   and	   kin	   ties,	   these	   organizations	   are	   rarely	   ever	   able	   to	   exclude	   anyone	   from	  
continued	  membership	  even	  when	  members	  have	  not	  fulfilled	  their	  obligations.	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The	   discussion	   in	   this	   section	   suggests	   that	   while	   liberalization	  may	   have	   enabled	   groundnut	  
RPOs	  to	  actively	  seek	  better	  output	  market	  conditions	  for	  their	  members,	  they	  are	  now	  in	  competition	  
with	  local	  traders	  when	  attempting	  to	  aggregate	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  output	  to	  trigger	  economies	  of	  
scale	  and	  enhance	  bargaining	  power.	  As	  we	  discuss	  below,	  while	   lack	  of	  financial	  means	  and	  technical	  
capacities	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   significant	   constraints,	   issues	   of	   coordination	   between	  members	   may	   also	  
contribute	  to	  this	  phenomenon	  	  
	  
3. Members’	  commitment	  and	  strategic	  uncertainty	  
	  
We	  investigate	  issues	  of	  collective	  commercialization	  using	  a	  sample	  of	  27	  village-­‐level	  RPOs	  for	  which	  
we	   conducted	   a	   baseline	   survey	   in	   November	   2011.	   This	   sample	   was	   drawn	   from	   a	   dataset	   of	   204	  
Senegalese	  RPOs	   involved	   in	  three	  value	  chains	   (onions,	   rice	  and	  groundnuts)	   from	  which	  we	  selected	  
those	   organizations	   that	   stated	   collective	   commercialization	   as	   one	   of	   their	   core	   objectives.	   We	  
identified	  75	  of	  these	  marketing-­‐type	  of	  organizations,	  but	  only	  include	  the	  27	  organizations	  involved	  in	  
the	  commercialization	  of	  groundnuts	  in	  our	  analysis.6	  	  
From	  each	   of	   these	   27	   groundnut	   RPOs,	   10	  member	   farmers	  were	   randomly	   selected	   for	   our	  
baseline	   survey.	   Data	   collected	   include	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics,	   production	   and	  
commercialization	  behavior	  during	  the	  season	  preceding	  the	  survey	  as	  well	  a	  set	  of	  attitudinal	  measures	  
related	   to	   risk	   aversion,	   preference	   for	   present,	   altruism	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   members	   and	   aversion	   to	  
strategic	   uncertainty.7	   Baseline	   data	   reveal	   that,	   first,	   the	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   members	   were	  
found	   to	   sell	   individually	   in	   spot	  market-­‐like	   transactions.	  These	   individual-­‐level	   sales	   to	  a	   local	   trader	  
appear	   to	   be	   fraught	  with	   difficulties.	  Member-­‐farmers	   are	   found	   to	   trade	   on-­‐farm	   or	   at	   the	  market	  
place	  without	   an	   indication	  of	   repeated	   interactions	   (only	   7%	  deal	   regularly	  with	   the	   same	   trader)	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  fact,	  RPOs	  supposedly	  marketing	  onions	  were	  found	  to	  only	  engage	  in	  the	  commercialization	  of	  wood	  collected	  
from	   nearby	   forest	   with	   proceeds	   being	   used	   to	   provide	   public	   goods	   for	   their	   village-­‐communities.	   These	  
organizations	   were	   not	   found	   to	   offer	   any	   services	   related	   to	   the	   onion	   value	   chain,	   effectively	   limiting	   their	  
relevance	   for	   our	   study.	   These	   organizations	   may	   be	   better	   categorized	   as	   community-­‐oriented	   organizations,	  
whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  provide	  public-­‐good	  type	  of	  services,	  not	  market-­‐oriented	  services	  for	  their	  members	  (Bernard	  
et	   al.	   2008).	   RPOs	   involved	   in	   the	   rice	   value	   chain	   were	   found	   to	   effectively	   collect	   some	   output	   from	   their	  
members.	   However,	   members	   provide	   this	   input	   to	   the	   organization	   only	   to	   pay	   for	   irrigation-­‐related	   services	  
provided	   by	   the	   RPO.	   In	   other	   words,	   RPOs	   operating	   in	   the	   rice	   value	   chain	   are	   essentially	   water-­‐usage	  
associations	  collecting	  payment	  for	  services	   in	  kind.	  These	  rice-­‐related	  water	  user	  associations	  therefore	  also	  fall	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  study.	  
7	   Aversion	   to	   strategic	   uncertainty	   was	   elicited	   by	   means	   of	   framed	   hypothetical	   coordination	   games	   akin	   to	  
Heinemann	   et	   al.	   (2009).	   Respondents	  were	   asked	   to	   choose	   between	   selling	   to	   a	   local	   trader	   at	   a	   known	   and	  
certain	  price	  or	  selling	   through	  the	  RPO	  at	  a	  price	   that	  could	  be	  high	  or	   low,	  depending	  upon	  whether	  15	  other	  
members	  would	  also	  decide	  to	  sell	  through	  the	  organization,	  although	  the	  individual	  would	  not	  know	  it	  at	  the	  time	  
he	  made	  his	  decision.	  The	  price	  offered	  by	  the	   local	  trader	  was	   initially	  set	  to	  be	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	   low	  price	  
that	  could	  be	  obtained	  in	  the	  organization	  if	  less	  than	  15	  members	  coordinated	  and	  then	  increased	  by	  increments	  
of	  twenty	  USD.	  The	  level	  at	  which	  an	  individual	  switches	  to	  selling	  through	  the	  local	  trader	  therefore	  measures	  the	  
maximum	  level	  of	  risk	  he	  or	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  take	  through	  the	  organization.	  Risk	  and	  time	  preferences	  were	  elicited	  
using,	   respectively,	   Holt	   and	   Laury	   (2002)	   and	   Andersen	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   multiple	   price	   lists.	   These	   were	   framed	  
similarly	  to	  the	  strategic	  uncertainty	  instrument	  –	  a	  similar	  approach	  was	  taken	  by	  Heinemann	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Finally,	  
altruism	  was	  elicited	  by	  means	  of	  a	  standard	  dictator	  game,	  again	  with	  similar	  payoff	   levels.	  The	  exact	  questions	  




pre-­‐harvest	  contracting	  (input	  or	  credit	  provision	  exists	  in	  less	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  cases).	  When	  asked	  about	  
difficulties	  faced	  when	  selling	  their	  produce	  only	  21%	  of	  the	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  there	  were	  no	  
major	  problems.	  For	   the	   remaining	  79%	  of	   respondents,	   the	  main	   issues	  cited	  were	   related	   to	   lack	  of	  
transportation	   means	   to	   reach	   more	   lucrative	   markets,	   insufficient	   knowledge	   of	   current	   prices,	  
insufficient	  visits	  by	  potential	  buyers,	  and	  insufficient	  quantity	  of	  produce	  to	  be	  able	  to	  negotiate	  prices.	  	  
Second,	   RPOs	   provided	   limited	   commercialization	   services	   despite	   their	   potential	   to	   address	  
some	  of	   the	   constraints	   affecting	   their	  members.	   In	   2011	  only	   11	  out	   of	   27	   groups	  had	  been	   able	   to	  
conduct	   a	   collective	   sale	   or	   to	   secure	   access	   to	  more	   remunerative	  markets.	   For	   those	   that	   did,	   only	  
about	  half	   of	  members	  were	   found	   to	  have	  participated.	   This	   limited	   involvement	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	  
with	  an	  apparent	  strong	  potential	   for	  collective	  commercialization.	  For	   instance,	   three	  quarters	  of	   the	  
respondents	  believed	  that	  the	  management	  committee	  has	  better	  knowledge	  and	  information	  on	  where	  
to	  find	  good	  traders	  or	  on	  current	  market	  or	  farm-­‐gate	  prices	  in	  the	  region.	  More	  generally,	  virtually	  all	  
members	  appear	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  collective	  commercialization	  could	  alleviate	  the	  main	  constraints	  
that	  they	  face	  at	  time	  of	  commercialization	  and	  73%	  believe	  that	  the	  organization	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  
member	  is	  technically	  capable	  of	  providing	  them	  with	  significant	  assistance	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  their	  output.	  	  
Third,	  the	  limited	  or	  non-­‐involvement	  in	  collective	  commercialization	  appears	  partly	  driven	  by	  a	  
member’s	  belief	   about	   the	   limited	  or	  non-­‐involvement	  of	  other	  members.	   For	   instance,	   following	   the	  
measurement	  of	  their	  strategic	  uncertainty,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  what	  they	  thought	  the	  response	  of	  
other	  members	   would	   be;	   nearly	   two	   thirds	   believed	   that	   fellow	  members	   would	   have	   settled	   for	   a	  
lower	   price	   offered	   by	   the	   trader.	   In	   Table	   1	   we	   report	   correlation	   coefficients	   from	   a	   simple	   OLS	  
regression	  relating	  the	  quantity	  that	  a	  member	  commercialized	  through	  the	  RPO	  in	  the	  previous	  season	  
(2011)	  and	   individual-­‐level	  measures	  of	  aversion	   to	   strategic	  uncertainty,	   risk	  aversion,	  preference	   for	  
present	   and	   altruism	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   group	   members.	   Because	   of	   high	   censoring	   these	   variables	   are	  
entered	  as	  binary	  measures.	   The	  dependent	   variable	   is	   the	  quantity	   commercialized	  by	   the	   individual	  
through	  the	  RPO	  in	  the	  season	  preceding	  the	  baseline	  survey.	  Control	  variables	  include	  basic	  farm	  and	  
household	  head	  characteristics,	  one’s	  leadership	  status	  within	  the	  group,	  along	  with	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
taking	  into	  account	  which	  of	  the	  two	  federations	  the	  group	  is	  a	  member	  of	  –	  as	  federations	  sometimes	  
play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   securing	   output	   markets.	   	   Results	   are	   rather	   clear	   showing	   that	   aversion	   to	  
strategic	   uncertainty	   is	   significantly	   and	   negatively	   correlated	   with	   past	   collective	   commercialization	  
behavior.	   Using	   this	   binary	   measure,	   individuals	   who	   reported	   any	   amount	   of	   strategic	   uncertainty	  
aversion	  sold	  0.27	  standard	  deviations	  less	  through	  the	  group	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  No	  such	  evidence	  is	  
found	  for	  risk	  aversion	  in	  the	  second	  column.	  While	  we	  do	  find	  that	  preference	  for	  present	  is	  negatively	  
correlated	  with	   group	   sales	   –	  while	   traders	   tend	   to	  pay	   cash,	   selling	   through	  RPOs	   sometimes	  means	  
payment	  only	  a	  few	  weeks	  later	  –	  the	  effect	  is	  found	  to	  be	  small	  in	  column	  3.	  Quite	  surprisingly,	  we	  find	  
that	  individuals	  that	  are	  found	  to	  be	  more	  altruistic	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  their	  fellow	  members	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  sell	  
their	  production	  through	  the	  group,	  although	  the	  magnitude	  of	   this	  effect	   is	  small	   in	  column	  4.	  Taken	  
altogether	   in	   column	   5,	   we	   find	   that	   aversion	   to	   strategic	   uncertainty	   clearly	   dominates	   all	   other	  
attitudinal	  measures	  when	  correlated	  with	  past	  commercialization	  behavior.	  	  
	   	  Overall,	   results	   suggest	   that	   issues	   of	   strategic	   uncertainty	   may	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	  
explaining	  collective	  commercialization	  behavior.	  Essentially,	  unless	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  a	  sufficient	  number	  
of	  other	  members	  will	   sell	   their	  output	   through	  the	  organization,	  an	   individual	  member	  has	  very	   little	  
incentive	  to	  refuse	  the	  offer	  of	  a	  trader	  and	  hold	  out	  for	  a	  collective	  sale	  through	  the	  organization.	  The	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process	   may	   be	   further	   reinforced	   by	   a	   member’s	   belief	   that	   others	   will	   react	   in	   a	   similar	   manner	  
culminating	  in	  an	  equilibrium	  with	  limited	  coordination	  as	  predicted	  and	  described	  by	  game	  theory	  (see	  
for	  example	  Morris	  and	  Shin	  2003).	  	  
	  
	  The	  relationship	  may	  run	  both	  ways:	  	  in	  organizations	  that	  have	  successfully	  managed	  to	  collectively	  
commercialize	  in	  the	  past,	  individuals	  may	  revise	  their	  beliefs	  that	  fellow	  members	  will	  also	  contribute	  
to	  the	  organization	  upward	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  their	  aversion	  to	  strategic	  uncertainty.	  
Further,	   some	   environmental	   or	   RPO	   attributes	   such	   as	   leadership	   capacities	   of	   the	   management	  
committee	  or	  kinship	  ties	  of	  individuals	  within	  the	  organization	  may	  contribute	  to	  explain	  both	  aversion	  
to	  strategic	  uncertainty	  as	  well	  as	  past	  experience	  of	  collective	  commercialization.	  To	  establish	  a	  causal	  
relationship,	  we	   thus	   design	   an	   experiment	   in	  which	  we	   affect	   an	   individual’s	   belief	   that	   others	  may	  
contribute	  to	  the	  organization.	  	  
	  
4. A	  model	  of	  strategic	  uncertainty	  and	  collective	  commercialization	  
	  
A	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  theoretical	  model	  is	  the	  coordination	  game	  with	  complete	  but	  imperfect	  
information	   discussed	   by	   Heinemann	   et	   al.	   (2009).	   Apart	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   simple	  
descriptive	   model	   of	   the	   collective	   marketing	   context,	   it	   also	   directly	   corresponds	   to	   the	   strategic	  
uncertainty	  measure	  we	  collected.	  Applied	   to	   the	  collective	  marketing	  context,	  we	  have	   the	   following	  
critical	   mass	   coordination	   game.	   Suppose	   an	   organization	   consists	   of	   𝑁	   small-­‐scale	   farmers	   who	  
simultaneously	   decide	  between	   two	   actions,	  𝐴	   (selling	   individually/directly	   to	   a	   trader)	   and	  𝐵	   (selling	  
collectively	  through	  the	  RPO	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  member).	  Action	  𝐴	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  fixed	  monetary	  
payoff	  𝑀	  (medium)	  regardless	  of	  what	  other	  members	  do	  since	  a	  direct	  and	  individual	  sale	  to	  a	  trader	  
typically	   pays	   a	   certain	   amount	   per	   kilogram.	   Action	   𝐵	   has	   an	   uncertain	   monetary	   payoff	   since	   it	  
depends	  on	  what	  other	  members	  do	  (this	   is	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  uncertainty	  stemming	  from	  (beliefs	  
about)	  the	  actions	  of	  others).	  In	  particular,	  this	  monetary	  payoff	  is	  𝐻	  (High)	  with	  𝐻 ≥ 𝑀,	  if	  and	  only	  if	  at	  
least	  𝐾	  farmers	  choose	  𝐵	  and	  𝐿	  (Low),	  with	  𝐿 ≤ 𝑀	  otherwise	  (where	  1 < 𝐾 ≤ 𝑁).	  	  
	   Intuitively,	  benefits	   to	  market	   collectively	  only	  arise	  when	  enough	  members	  are	   involved.	  The	  
basic	   rationale	   for	   this	   is	   the	   following.	   The	  RPO	  will	   typically	  negotiate	  a	  price	  with	  a	   contract	  buyer	  
who	  offers	  a	  premium	  above	  the	  trader’s	  price	  (the	  payoff	  from	  action	  𝐴)	  provided	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  
quantity	   is	  offered.	  This	  quantity	  tends	  to	  be	  so	  large	  that	   it	  cannot	  be	  provided	  by	  just	  one	  individual	  
farmer;	   complying	   with	   the	   contract	   thus	   requires	   coordination.	   Furthermore,	   contracts	   tend	   to	   be	  
rather	  discrete:	  if	  a	  certain	  threshold	  is	  not	  met,	  the	  contract	  is	  void	  since	  the	  benefits	  do	  not	  outweigh	  
the	  costs	  for	  the	  buyer.	  Alternatively,	  one	  may	  think	  of	  the	  RPO	  renting	  a	  truck	  to	  access	  more	  distant	  
and	  remunerative	  markets.	  The	  rental	  cost	  has	  to	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  quantity	  that	  is	  transported	  such	  that	  
only	   if	   a	   minimum	   quantity	   is	   aggregated	   is	   it	   worthwhile	   to	   rent	   the	   truck	   for	   those	   who	   used	   the	  
service.	  In	  both	  cases	  of	  failure	  to	  comply,	  which	  arises	  if	  not	  enough	  farmers	  choose	  action	  𝐵,	  tends	  to	  
lead	  to	  a	  low	  payoff	  of	  𝐿 ≤ 𝑀.	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   The	  strategic	  uncertainty	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  this	  coordination	  game	  makes	  it	  an	  ideal	  descriptive	  
model	   of	   our	   collective	   marketing	   context.8	   The	   game	   is	   characterized	   by	  𝑁,	  𝐾,	   the	   own	   monetary	  
payoffs	  Π = {𝐿,𝑀,𝐻},	  and	  (4)	  utility	  functions	  over	  these	  payoffs,	  𝑈(Π).	  To	  illustrate	  our	  model	  further,	  
suppose	   that	   we	   represent	   the	  𝑁-­‐farmer	   game	   as	   a	   game	   between	   farmer	   𝑖	   and	   all	   other	   farmers,	  
represented	  as	  farmer	  – 𝑖.9	  Then,	  the	  normal	  or	  strategic	  form	  representation	  of	  this	  game	  can	  be	  given	  
by	  means	  of	  the	  following	  table	  where	  the	  players	  each	  have	  a	  choice	  between	  two	  possible	  actions	  𝐴	  
and	  𝐵	  of	  which	  the	  monetary	  payoffs	  depends	  on	  the	  others	  players’	  actions:	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Normal-­‐form	  representation	  of	  coordination	  game	  with	  generic	  payoffs	  
	   	   Farmer	  −𝑖	  
   𝐴	   𝐵  
Farmer	  𝑖	  
𝐴   	   (𝐿, 𝐿)	   (𝑀, 𝐿)	  
𝐵   	   (𝐿,𝑀)	   (𝐻,𝐻)	  
	  
If	  farmers	  are	  able	  to	  coordinate	  on	  action	  𝐵,	  everyone	  receives	  a	  high	  monetary	  payoff	  equal	  to	  𝐻.	  In	  
the	  absence	  thereof,	  those	  who	  choose	  action	  𝐴	  never	  face	  a	  payoff	  risk	  and	  receive	  𝑀,	  while	  those	  who	  
choose	  𝐵	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  since	  they	  get	  the	  lowest	  possible	  payoff	  𝐿.	  For	  illustrative	  purposes,	  
suppose	  𝐿 = 0,	  𝑀 = 5,	  and	  𝐻 = 10.	  Then	  we	  would	  have	  the	  following	  payoff	  matrix:	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Normal-­‐form	  representation	  of	  coordination	  game	  with	  sample	  payoffs	  
	   	   Farmer	  −i	  
   A	   B  
Farmer	  i	  
A   	   (5,5)	   (5,0)	  
B   	   (0,5)	   (10,10)	  
	  
(i) Equilibrium	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  changes	  in	  perceptions	  
	  
To	  solve	  the	  generic	  version	  of	  the	  game	  (Table	  2),	  suppose	  that	   farmer	  𝑖	  believes	  that	   farmer	  −𝑖	  will	  
choose	  action	  𝐴	  with	  probability	  1 − 𝑞	  and	  action	  𝐵	  with	  probability	  𝑞.	  Farmer	  𝑖’s	  expected	  utility	  from	  
choosing	  action	  𝐴	  and	  action	  𝐵	  are	  𝐸𝑈! 𝐴 = 𝑈(𝑀)	  and	  𝐸𝑈! 𝐵 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑈(𝐿) + 𝑞𝑈(𝐻)	  respectively.	  
Similarly,	   if	   farmer	  −𝑖	  believes	   that	   farmer	   𝑖	  will	   choose	  action	  𝐴	  with	  probability	  1 − 𝑝	   and	  action	  𝐵	  
with	  probability	  𝑝,	  we	  have	  𝐸𝑈!! 𝐴 = 𝑈(𝑀)	  and	  𝐸𝑈!! 𝐵 = 1 − 𝑝 𝑈 𝐿 + 𝑝𝑈 𝐻 .	  So,	  the	  farmers’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  type	  of	  game	  is	  similar	  to	  Rousseau’s	  “stag	  hunt”	  parable.	  As	  noted	  by	  Van	  Huyck	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  based	  on	  the	  
discussion	  by	  Crawford	  (2001;	  originally,	  a	  working	  paper	  from	  1989),	  critical	  mass	  is	  needed	  when	  hunting	  a	  stag	  
(in	  our	  case,	   selling	   through	  the	  RPO),	  whereas	  hunting	  a	   rabbit	   (in	  our	  case,	   selling	   to	   the	   trader)	  can	  easily	  be	  
done	  individually	  although	  associated	  benefits	  may	  be	  lower.	  	  	  
9	  An	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  this	  coordination	  game	  is	  that	  individual	  decisions	  are	  being	  made	  simultaneously.	  
This	   is	   different	   from	   certain	   threshold	   or	   critical	   mass	   models	   (see	   for	   example	   Granovetter	   1978)	   in	   which	  
decision-­‐making	  is	  sequential.	  While	  such	  models	  give	  rise	  to	  first-­‐mover	  opportunities,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  
such	   level	   of	   detail	   in	   our	   data	   in	   order	   to	   test	   a	  model	  with	   sequential	   decision-­‐making.	   Furthermore,	   traders	  
typically	   visit	   farmers	   before	   any	   eventual	   call	   by	   the	   RPO	   for	   collective	   commercialization	   occurs	   (traders	  may	  
even	   visit	   farmers	   before	   harvest).	   With	   imperfect	   information	   regarding	   what	   fellow	   members	   may	   (have)	  
answer(ed)	  when	  visited	  by	  a	  trader,	  an	  individual	  facing	  a	  trader’s	  offer	  is	  in	  effect	  playing	  a	  simultaneous	  game.	  	  
10	  
	  
decisions	  will	   in	  part	  depend	  on	  the	  assumptions	  on	  utility	  functions.	  We	  assume,	  in	  a	  rather	  standard	  
way,	  that	  utility	  is	  non-­‐decreasing	  over	  own	  monetary	  payoffs,	  that	  is	  𝑈! ≥ 0.	  	  
	   Farmer	   𝑖	   will	   choose	   action	   𝐵	   over	   action	   𝐴	   if	   𝐸𝑈! 𝐵 > 𝐸𝑈!(𝐴),	   which	   implies	   that	   𝑞 >
𝑈 𝑋 − 𝑈(𝑆) 𝑈 𝑅 − 𝑈(𝑆) .	   In	   equilibrium	   the	   probability	   with	   which	   each	   player	   chooses	  𝐵,	  𝑝,	  
solves	   𝑞 = 𝑈 𝑀 − 𝑈(𝐿) 𝑈 𝐻 − 𝑈(𝐿) ≤ 1	   (since	   𝑈! > 0	   and	   𝐻 ≥ 𝑀 ≥ 𝐿),	   where	   𝑞	   is	   the	  
probability	   that	   at	   least	  𝐾 − 1	   of	   the	   other	  𝑁 − 1	   farmers	   choose	   action	  𝐵.	   This	   probability	   can	   be	  
expressed	   as  𝑞 = 𝑃 𝐽 ≥ 𝐾 − 1 = 1 − 𝑃 𝐽 ≤ 𝐾 − 2 = 1 − 𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝑁 − 1,𝐾 − 2, 𝑝),	   where	   𝐽	   is	   the	  
number	   of	   other	   farmers	   who	   choose	   option	   𝐵	   and	   𝐵𝑖𝑛(. )	   represents	   the	   cumulative	   binomial	  
distribution.	  The	  binomial	  distribution	  is	  appropriate	  since	  each	  farmer	  coordinates	  with	  probability	  𝑝	  (a	  
so-­‐called	   success)	   or	   does	   not	   coordinate	  with	  probability	  1 − 𝑝	   (a	   so-­‐called	   failure).	   So,	  𝑝	   solves	   the	  
following	  equation:	  	  
	  
𝐹 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑖𝑛 𝑁 − 1,𝐾 − 2, 𝑝 = 𝑈 𝑀 − 𝑈 𝐿 𝑈 𝑅 − 𝑈 𝐿 .	  
	  
This	   equation	   allows	   us	   to	   derive	   the	   following	   main	   comparative	   static	   using	   the	   implicit	   function	  
theorem:	  
	  
𝜕𝑝 𝜕𝐾 = −[𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝐾/  𝜕𝐹/𝜕𝑝] = −[−𝜕𝐵𝑖𝑛(. )/𝜕𝐾/  −𝜕𝐵𝑖𝑛(. )/𝜕𝑝] = −[− ⋅ +/− ⋅ −] > 0	  	  
	  
by	   properties	   of	   𝐵𝑖𝑛(. ).10	   This	   result	   states	   that	   as	   the	   minimum	   number	   of	   farmers	   choosing	   to	  
coordinate	  (𝐾)	  increases	  or	  is	  perceived/believed	  to	  increase,	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  given	  farmer	  choosing	  
to	  coordinate	  (𝑝)	  also	  increases.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  finding	  in	  our	  context	  since	  our	  intervention	  varied	  
the	   number	   of	   members	   or	   leaders	   invited	   to	   the	   three-­‐day	   training.	   Given	   that	   the	   training	   was	  
designed	  to	  highlight	  the	  net	  benefits	  of	  collective	  marketing,	  one	  would	  expect	  this	  to	  increase	  𝐾	  or	  at	  
least,	   foster	   the	   perception	   of	   an	   increase	   in	  𝐾.	   This	   in	   turn	   is	   expected	   to	   increase	   a	   given	   farmer’s	  
likelihood	  to	  coordinate,	  𝑝.	  	  	  
	  
(ii) The	  effect	  of	  different	  types	  of	  players	  
	  
Now	  we	  suppose	  that	  any	  given	  farmer	  𝑖	  has	  a	  type	  𝜃!.	  If	  farmer	  𝑖	  is	  a	  regular	  member,	  his	  type	  is	  𝜃!",	  
and	   if	   farmer	   𝑖	   is	   a	   leader	   of	   the	   organization,	   his	   type	   is	   𝜃!".11	   This	   parameter	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	  
farmer’s	   social	   category	   which	   also	   determines	   his	   social	   distance	   from	   others.12	   Suppose	   we	   let	  
𝐷!,!! = |𝜃! − 𝜃!!|	   define	   the	   social	   distance	   between	   farmer	   𝑖	   and	   farmer	  −𝑖	   where	   each	   of	   these	  
farmers	  can	  be	  of	  type	  𝜃!	  or	  𝜃!.	  𝐷!,!! 	  can	  take	  three	  values:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  curvature	  properties	  of	  the	  binomial	  distribution	  can	  be	  shown	  analytically	  by	  taking	  partial	  derivatives	  with	  
respect	   to	   the	   full	  expression.	  Basically,	  as	  𝑝	   increases,	  each	  distribution	   first-­‐order	  stochastically	  dominates	   the	  
previous.	   Empirically,	   these	   can	  also	  be	   confirmed	  by	   simulating	  an	   initial	  distribution	  with	  parameters	  𝑝 = 0.5,	  
𝑁 = 30,	  and	  𝐾 = 15,	  and	  subsequently	  changing	  𝑝	   ceteris	  paribus.	  This	   is	   just	  an	  example;	   the	  broader	  point	   is	  
that	  for	  any	  𝑁	  and	  𝐾 ≤ 𝑁,	  this	  property	  can	  be	  confirmed.	  	  
11	   We	   can	   extend	   this	   setup	   to	   comprise	   a	   continuum	   of	   types;	   however,	   we	   believe	   this	   setup	   is	   sufficiently	  
general	  to	  capture	  reality.	  
12	   As	   discussed	   by	   Sobel	   (2005,	   page	   402),	   such	   a	   parameter	   can	   comprise	   the	   farmer’s	   personal/social	  




1) If	  both	  farmers	  are	  regular	  members,	  we	  have	  𝐷!,!! = 𝐷!",!!" = 𝜃!" − 𝜃!!" .	  
2) If	  both	  farmers	  are	  leaders,	  we	  have	  𝐷!,!! = 𝐷!",!!" = 𝜃!" − 𝜃!!" .	  	  
3) If	  the	  farmers	  are	  not	  of	  the	  same	  type,	  we	  have	  𝐷!,!! = 𝐷!",!!" = 𝐷!",!!" = 𝜃!" − 𝜃!!" .	  	  
	  
This	  social	  distance	  may	  affect	  farmer	  𝑖’s	  belief	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  other	  farmers	  to	  coordinate.	   In	  
other	   words,	   farmer	   𝑖	   may	   place	   a	   different	   weight	   on	   another	   farmer’s	   𝑝	   depending	   on	   the	   social	  
distance	  between	  them	  (more	  below).13	  	  
	   Suppose	   farmer	   𝑖	  weighs	  other	   farmers’	  𝑝	   by	   the	   social	  distance	  between	   them	  𝐷!,!!.	   Let	   this	  
weight	  be	  bounded	  below	  by	  0	   and	  above	  by	  1.14	   Introducing	   this	  weight	   into	   the	   former	  model,	  we	  
have	  the	  following	  revised	  indifference	  condition:	  𝑞 = 1 − 𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝑁 − 1,𝐾 − 2,𝐷!,!!𝑝).	  So,	  𝑝	  now	  solves	  
the	  following	  equation	  which	  we	  define	  as	  𝐺:	  
	  
𝐺 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑖𝑛 𝑁 − 1,𝐾 − 2,𝐷!,!!𝑝 = 𝑈 𝑀 − 𝑈 𝐿 𝑈 𝐻 − 𝑈 𝑆 .	  
	  
This	  equation	  allows	  us	  to	  derive	  the	  following	  comparative	  static	  using	  a	  discrete	  version	  of	  the	  implicit	  
function	  theorem:	  
	  
Δ𝑝 Δ𝐷 = −[Δ𝐺/Δ𝐷/  Δ𝐺/Δ𝑝] = −[−Δ𝐵𝑖𝑛(. )/Δ𝐷/  −𝐷!,!!Δ𝐵𝑖𝑛(. )/Δ𝑝] = −[− ⋅ −/− ⋅ −] < 0	  	  
	  
by	   properties	   of	  𝐵𝑖𝑛(. ).	   This	   result	   says	   that	   as	   the	   social	   distance	   between	   farmers	   decreases,	   the	  
probability	  of	  a	  given	  farmer	  choosing	  to	  coordinate	  (𝑝)	  increases.	  This	  finding	  is	  relevant	  for	  our	  context	  
since	   we	   varied	   the	   type	   of	   person—member	   or	   leader—who	   was	   invited	   to	   the	   training.	   We	   also	  
elicited	  trust	  attitudes	  within	  the	  group	  by	  asking	  whether	  the	  respondent	  would	  trust	  person	  X	  to	  look	  
after	  her/his	  agricultural	  plot	  if	  s/he	  had	  to	  leave	  the	  village	  for	  two	  months.	   	  So,	  we	  can	  test	  whether	  
social	  distance	  matters.	  While	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  question,	  what	  matters	  eventually	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
this	  study	  is	  that	  social	  distance	  can	  theoretically	  affect	  (perceptions	  of)	  coordination	  since	  this	  in	  turn	  
yields	  a	  testable	  hypothesis.	  	  
	  
(iii) Combined	  effects	  
	  
The	   first	  comparative	  static	  above	  suggests	   that	   (the	  belief	   that)	  a	   sufficient	  number	  of	  other	   farmers	  
commercializing	   through	   the	   RPO	   will	   impact	   one’s	   likelihood	   of	   also	   commercializing	   through	   the	  
organization.	  The	  second	  comparative	  static	  suggests	  that	  another	  farmer’s	  type	  (as	  characterized	  by	  a	  
social	   distance	   parameter)	   may	   also	   impact	   one’s	   likelihood	   of	   commercializing	   through	   the	  
organization.	   These	   results	   can	   of	   course	   be	   combined.	   Together	   they	   suggest	   that	   if	   enough	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Social	  distance	  may	  matter	  because	  (1)	  peers	  tend	  to	  have	  better	  information	  about	  each	  other’s	  preferences,	  
constraints;	   and	   (2)	   trust	   and	   trustworthiness	   tend	   to	   be	   different	   among	   peers	   than	   among	   people	   of	   distinct	  
social	  strata.	  	  
14	  This	  is	  a	  technical	  assumption,	  which	  allows	  the	  weighted	  probabilities	  to	  satisfy	  standard	  properties.	  It	  is	  a	  fairly	  
common	  assumption	  for	  weight	  functions.	  
12	  
	  
farmers	  of	  a	  given	  type—in	  this	  case	  leaders—change	  their	  behavior,	  an	  individual	  farmer	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  
change	  his/her	  behavior.	  	  
	  
5. Experimental	  design	  and	  data	  
	  
(i) Sample	  and	  power	  issues	  
	  
We	  use	  the	  sample	  of	  27	  RPOs	  for	  which	  we	  collected	  baseline	  information	  and	  conduct	  the	  randomized	  
control	  trial	  described	  further	  below.	  The	  Impact	   is	  estimated	  for	  240	  members	  of	  these	  organizations	  
who	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  training.	  Our	  current	  design	  is	  limited	  in	  power	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  our	  
initial	  sample	  of	  75	  RPOs	  for	  which	  collective	  commercialization	  is	  a	  core	  objective	  is	  reduced	  to	  those	  
27	  handling	   groundnuts.	   Second,	  our	  main	   treatment	   and	   its	   variations	   are	   implemented	  at	   the	  RPO-­‐
level	  further	  contributing	  to	  limited	  power.	  In	  effect,	  individuals	  within	  these	  organizations	  may	  not	  take	  
a	  fully	  independent	  decision.	  Not	  only	  are	  they	  exposed	  to	  a	  similar	  natural	  and	  economic	  environment	  
and	   its	   variations,	   they	   may	   also	   respond	   to	   each	   other’s	   behavior	   in	   terms	   of	   collective	  
commercialization.	   Our	   data	   indicate	   a	   .64	   intra-­‐group	   correlation	   coefficient	   for	   the	   quantity	   of	  
groundnuts	  sold	  through	  the	  organization	  in	  the	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  intervention.	  With	  large	  intra-­‐cluster	  
correlation,	   RPO-­‐level	   treatment	   and	   limited	   number	   of	   organizations,	   our	   study	   is	   only	   powered	   to	  
detect	  the	  relatively	  large	  effect	  of	  the	  intervention	  on	  our	  main	  outcome	  variable.	  In	  other	  words,	  our	  
conclusions	   are	   limited	   in	   scope	   to	   those	   effects	   that	   are	   sufficiently	   large	   in	   size	   to	   be	   statistically	  
detectable	  given	  our	  sample	  size	  and	  structure.	  
	  
(ii) Intervention	  design	  and	  beneficiaries	  
	  
To	   test	   the	   importance	   of	   coordination	   issues	   in	   explaining	   successes	   or	   failures	   to	   commercialize	  
collectively,	   we	   organized	   a	   three-­‐day	   training	   and	   discussion	   around	   the	   potential	   benefits	   and	  
difficulties	  of	   coordinating	   towards	   collective	  marketing.15	   The	   training	  was	  held	   in	   January	  2012,	   and	  
was	  organized	   in	   three	  modules:	   (1)	   the	  potential	  and	  pitfalls	  of	  collective	  marketing,	   (2)	  coordination	  
within	   organizations	   –	   the	   role	   of	   communication	   in	   collective	   marketing	   and	   (3)	   motivation	   for	  
coordination	  –	  members	  and	  leaders.16	  	  
	   Five	   randomly	   selected	   organizations	   served	   as	   a	   pure	   control	   group	   in	   our	   design	   as	   neither	  
their	   regular	   members	   nor	   their	   leaders	   were	   invited	   to	   the	   training.	   For	   each	   of	   the	   remaining	   22	  
organizations,	   we	   randomly	   drew	   two	   discrete	   numbers	  𝑚𝑒	   and	   𝑙𝑒,	   each	   ranging	   from	   0	   to	   4.	   The	  
number	  𝑚𝑒	   provided	   us	   with	   the	   number	   of	  members	   to	   be	   invited	   to	   the	   training	   and	   𝑙𝑒	   with	   the	  
number	  of	   individuals	   in	   leadership	  positions	   (that	   is,	  members	  of	   the	  management	  committee)	   to	  be	  
invited	  to	  the	  training.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  individuals	  trained	  is	  thus	  obtained	  by	  	  𝑡𝑜 = 𝑚𝑒 + 𝑙𝑒.	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	  note	  that	   treatment	  assignment	  was	  not	   fully	   respected	   in	  about	  half	  of	   the	  
organizations.	  As	  Table	  4	  shows,	  there	  were	  instances	  where	  some	  invited	  individuals	  did	  not	  show	  up	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  training	  was	  organized	  in	  partnership	  with	  GRET	  (a	  French	  non-­‐governmental	  organization)	  and	  PINORD	  (a	  
Senegalese	  NGO)	  and	  the	  two	  federations	  to	  which	  the	  27	  RPOs	  belong	  
16	  The	  training	  manual	  is	  available	  from	  the	  authors	  upon	  request.	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to	  the	  training;	  more	  than	  the	  intended	  number	  of	  invitees	  showed	  up	  or	  the	  distribution	  of	  proportion	  
of	   members	   and	   leaders	   invited	   was	   not	   fully	   respected.	   There	   is	   thus	   some	   level	   of	   imperfect	  
compliance,	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  be	  related	  to	  organization	  and	  individual-­‐level	  characteristics.	  To	  account	  
for	   this	   imperfect	   compliance,	   all	   estimations	   presented	   in	   the	   paper	   rely	   on	   the	   intended	   treatment	  
only.	  	  
	   Invitees	  were	  randomly	  selected	  from	  lists	  of	  leaders	  and	  members	  obtained	  from	  a	  survey	  held	  
in	  2009	  to	  identify	  collaborating	  RPOs.	  Our	  main	  research	  interest	  however	  lies	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  those	  
individuals	   who	   did	   not	   attend	   the	   training	   but	   who	   observed	   participation	   of	   some	   of	   their	   fellow	  
members.	  Our	  effective	  experimental	   sample	   thus	   rests	  on	   ten	   randomly	   selected	  members	   from	   the	  
initial	  list	  who	  were	  not	  invited	  to	  the	  training.	  By	  the	  time	  our	  intervention	  took	  place	  some	  individuals	  
no	   longer	   lived	   in	  or	  were	  absent	   from	   their	   village.	  Our	   final	   sample	   thus	   includes	  304	   individuals	  of	  
whom	   64	   attended	   a	   training	   session	   and	   240	   did	   not.	   The	   behavior	   of	   the	   latter	   group	   can	   only	   be	  
affected	   by	   the	   training	   in	   an	   indirect	   manner	   through	   interaction	   with	   or	   observation	   of	   fellow	  




We	  collected	  three	  rounds	  of	  data.	  First,	  baseline	  data	  on	  all	  304	  individuals	  was	  collected	  in	  November	  
2011.	   At	   that	   time,	   while	   people	   may	   have	   assumed	   that	   there	   would	   be	   subsequent	   activities,	   no	  
details	   of	   the	   intervention	   were	   given	   and	   it	   was	   kept	   intentionally	   unclear	   that	   there	   would	   be	  
subsequent	  primary	  beneficiaries.	  The	  baseline	  survey	  was	  very	  short	  and	  essentially	  collected	  minimal	  
member	  and	  organizational-­‐level	  characteristics	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  3.	  
The	   training	   for	   the	   groundnut	   RPOs	   was	   held	   during	   January	   2012.	   We	   conducted	   another	  
survey	   two	   to	   four	  weeks	  after	   the	   training.	  This	   survey	  was	  essentially	   focused	  on	  collecting	  another	  
round	  of	   the	  attitudinal	  measures	   (strategic	  uncertainty,	   risk,	   time,	  and	  social	  preferences,	  and	  so	  on)	  
and	  dissemination	  of	  the	  training	  content	  to	  those	  who	  did	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  training.	  In	  particular,	  
each	  non-­‐trained	  individual	  was	  asked	  about	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  or	  her	  personal	  relationship	  with	  each	  
trainee	   (pictures	   were	   used	   for	   this	   purpose).	   Finally,	   each	   RPO	   was	   asked	   to	   collect	   collective	  
commercialization	   data	   during	   the	   months	   following	   the	   training	   using	   purposefully	   designed	  
notebooks.	   These	   were	   collected	   by	   the	   researchers	   9	   months	   later	   when	   the	   2012	   groundnut	  
commercialization	  campaign	  had	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  	  
One	  important	  limitation	  of	  our	  data	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  complete	  2012	  commercialization	  data	  for	  all	  
individuals	   in	   our	   sample:	   we	   are	   only	   able	   to	   observe	   whether	   an	   individual	   has	   sold	   any	   output	  
through	   the	  RPO,	  and	   if	   so,	   the	  corresponding	  quantity.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  data	  on	  prices	  obtained	  by	  
farmers	  through	  individual	  sales,	  we	  are	  therefore	  unable	  to	  estimate	  the	  impact	  of	  our	  intervention	  on	  
farmers’	   welfare.	   Our	   analysis	   is	   thus	   restricted	   to	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	   our	   intervention	   on	   the	  
willingness	  of	  members	  to	  sell	  their	  output	  via	  the	  organization	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  member.	  
	  
(iv) Experimental	  integrity	  
	  
To	   ensure	   that	   our	   various	   treatments	   are	   independent	   from	   any	   baseline	   characteristics,	   we	   run	   a	  
series	   of	   balancing	   tests	   relating	   treatment	   to	   characteristics	   of	   individual	   members	   and	   the	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organization	   to	   which	   they	   belong.	   In	   Table	   5,	   we	   report	   results	   from	   OLS	   regressions	   in	   which	   the	  
dependent	  variables	  are	  the	  three	  treatment	  variables	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  Column	  
1	   presents	   the	   mean	   and	   corresponding	   standard	   deviation	   of	   each	   variable.	   Results	   presented	   in	  
columns	  2	  to	  4	  suggest	  that	  the	  various	  treatments	  are	  independent	  of	  individual	  and	  organization-­‐level	  
characteristics.	  There	  is	  some	  indication	  that	  land	  controlled	  by	  member	  farmers	  is	  slightly	  lower	  in	  the	  
treatment	  group	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  control	  group	  but	  this	  difference	  is	  not	  quantitatively	  meaningful.	  	  
Overall,	   these	   results	   support	   the	   absence	   of	   correlation	   between	   the	   type	   of	   treatment	   an	  
individual	  is	  exposed	  to,	  and	  his/her	  own	  characteristics.	  As	  our	  sample	  is	  somewhat	  small,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	   identify	   relatively	   small	   differences	   in	   these	   characteristics.	  All	   estimates	   reported	  below	   therefore	  
control	  for	  these	  characteristics	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  robustness	  of	  results.	  	  
	  
6. Empirical	  strategy	  and	  results	  
	  
We	  start	  by	  assessing	  whether	  aversion	  to	  strategic	  uncertainty	  has	  evolved	  between	  our	  baseline	  and	  
the	   follow-­‐up	   survey.	   Table	   6	   reports	   simple	   tests	   of	   difference	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	   individuals	   who	  
reported	  no	   aversion	   to	   strategic	   uncertainty	   (variable	   is	   equal	   to	   zero)	   or	   reported	   some	   (variable	   is	  
equal	   to	   one).	   Column	   1	   shows	   that	   there	   are	   no	   differences	   in	   strategic	   uncertainty	   at	   baseline	  
between	  the	  group	  of	  trainees	  (row	  A),	  non-­‐trainees	   in	  treatment	  groups	  (row	  B),	  and	  non-­‐trainees	   in	  
control	  groups	   (row	  C).	  We	  find	  however	   that	  all	   trainees	  had	  the	   lowest	  possible	   level	  of	  aversion	  to	  
strategic	   uncertainty	   at	   follow-­‐up	   and	   thus	   a	   difference	   with	   their	   baseline	   level	   that	   is	   statistically	  
significant	   (Row	   A,	   column	   3).	   Similarly,	   non-­‐trainees	   in	   the	   treatment	   groups	   reported	   a	   statistically	  
lower	  level	  of	  aversion	  to	  strategic	  uncertainty	  at	  follow-­‐up	  as	  compared	  to	  their	  baseline	  level	  (row	  B,	  
column	  3).	  No	   such	  differences	  are	   found	   in	   the	   control	   group	   (row	  C,	   column	  3).	   Thus,	  while	  merely	  
suggestive,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  evolution	  of	  attitudes	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  collective	  commercialization	  between	  
baseline	  and	  follow-­‐up	  surveys	   in	  the	  treatment	  group.	  More	  specifically,	   results	  suggest	  that	  trainees	  
did	   return	   to	   their	   respective	   organization	   with	   a	   strong	   level	   of	   commitment	   to	   collective	  
commercialization	  and	  that	  part	  of	  their	  renewed	  motivation	  was	  passed	  on	  to	  fellow	  members	  who	  had	  
not	  attended	  the	  training.	  We	  further	  test	  for	  these	  changes	  in	  actual	  behavior	  below.	  
	  
(i) Econometric	  specification	  
	  
We	   are	   interested	   to	   assess	   whether	   a	   member’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   likely	   participation	   of	   other	  
members	   in	   collective	   commercialization	   can	   help	   trigger	   his	   or	   her	   increased	   involvement	   in	   such	  
activities.	  We	   rely	   on	   the	   three	   treatment	   variables	   discussed	   above,	   along	  with	   the	   part	   our	   sample	  
composed	  of	  non-­‐trained	   individuals.17	  Our	  main	  outcome	  variable	   is	   the	  quantity	  of	   groundnuts	   that	  
was	  sold	  through	  the	  RPO	  in	  the	  2012	  commercialization	  season.	  	  
	   To	   account	   for	   potential	   remaining	   bias	   not	   revealed	   in	   Table	   5,	   we	   control	   for	  member	   and	  
organization-­‐level	   characteristics,	   including	   literacy,	   gender,	   age,	   farm	   size,	   leadership	   position	  within	  
the	   organization,	   size	   of	   the	   organization	   as	   well	   as	   a	   dummy	   for	   the	   federation	   to	   which	   the	   RPO	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  All	   results	  presented	  hold	   if	  we	   include	   the	  rest	  of	   trained	   individuals	  alongside	  non-­‐trained	   individuals	   in	   the	  
sample.	  However,	  for	  clarity	  purpose	  we	  report	  results	  on-­‐trained	  individuals	  only.	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belongs.	   This	   last	   variable	   is	   particularly	   important	   as	   some	   of	   the	   commercialization-­‐related	   services	  
offered	   by	   a	   village-­‐level	   RPO	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   activities	   undertaken	   at	   the	   federation	   level.	   For	  
instance,	  while	  one	  of	   the	  two	  federations	  sometimes	  engages	   in	  providing	  access	  to	  credit	  at	  time	  of	  
commercialization,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  other	  one.	  All	  estimates	  rely	  on	  the	  ANCOVA	  specification,	  
where	   an	   individual’s	   level	   of	   commercialization	   through	   the	   organization	   in	   the	   previous	   year	   is	  
included	  amongst	  the	  regressors.	  As	  discussed	  by	  McKenzie	  (2012),	  ANCOVA	  specifications	  prove	  more	  
efficient	  when	  using	  potentially	  noisy	  outcome	  measures.	  Lastly,	  all	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  
level	   of	   the	  RPO-­‐level	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   non-­‐independence	   of	   behavior	   among	  members	   of	   the	  
same	  RPO.	  
	  
(ii) Treatment	  effects	  
	  
Our	  main	  results	  are	  reported	   in	  Table	  7.	   In	  column	  1,	  we	  first	  assess	  whether	  being	  affiliated	  with	  an	  
organization	   where	   at	   least	   one	   individual	   was	   invited	   to	   the	   training	   affects	   a	   member’s	   level	   of	  
commercialization	  through	  this	  organization.	  This	  binary	  treatment	  does	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  issues	  of	  
coordination	   and	   could	   instead	   merely	   capture	   an	   informational	   effect.	   In	   fact,	   trainees	   were	  
encouraged	  to	  relay	  the	  training	  content	  to	  fellow	  members.	  According	  to	  the	  data	  collected	  two	  to	  four	  
weeks	  after	  the	  training,	  96%	  of	  trainees	  did	  relay	  training	  content;	   in	  85%	  of	  the	  cases	  this	  was	  done	  
through	  an	  organization-­‐level	  meeting.	  This	   in	   turn	  suggests	   that	  non-­‐trainees	  of	   the	   treatment	  group	  
may	  have	  had	  access	  to	  similar	  information	  on	  the	  training	  content	  regardless	  of	  the	  number	  of	  trainees	  
within	  the	  organization.	  While	  this	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  direct	  test	  of	  our	  main	  hypothesis,	  this	  result	  
provides	  a	  first	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  intervention	  on	  collective	  commercialization,	  indicating	  
that	   being	   in	   the	   treatment	   group	   is	   associated	   with	   an	   average	   of	   about	   137	   additional	   kg	   of	  
groundnuts	  sold	  through	  the	  organization.	  This	  is	  	  rather	  large	  in	  magnitude,	  accounting	  for	  0.3	  standard	  
deviations	  of	  collective	  commercialization	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  
	  
(iii) Number	  and	  type	  of	  trainees	  
	  
We	   subsequently	   test	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   number	   and	   type	   of	  members	   committed	   to	   collective	  
commercialization	   affects	   the	   commercialization	   behavior	   of	   others	   above	   and	   beyond	   mere	  
informational	  channels.	  Results	  are	  reported	  in	  columns	  2	  to	  6	  of	  Table	  7.	  In	  column	  2	  we	  introduce	  the	  
number	   of	   members	   invited	   to	   the	   training.	   We	   find	   no	   effect	   beyond	   that	   of	   having	   at	   least	   one	  
individual	   trained.	   This	   contrasts	  with	   results	   in	   column	  3	  where	  we	   introduce	   the	  number	  of	   leaders	  
who	  were	  invited	  to	  the	  training.	  Here,	  we	  find	  evidence	  that	  for	  a	  given	  number	  of	  individuals	  trained,	  
each	   additional	   leader	   invited	   to	   the	   training	   is	   associated	   with	   74	   kg	   of	   additional	   output	  
commercialized	  through	  the	  organization	   in	  the	  sample	  of	  non-­‐trained	  individuals.	  Thus,	  while	  we	  find	  
no	  evidence	  of	  critical	  mass	  effect	  in	  column	  2,	  column	  3	  does	  suggest	  that	  the	  type	  of	  individuals	  that	  
were	   trained	   (leaders	   in	   this	   case)	   affects	   commercialization	   behavior	   beyond	   the	   binary	   treatment	  
effect	  identified	  in	  column	  1.	  	   	  
	   At	   this	   stage,	   however,	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	   these	  effects	   are	  driven	  by	   the	   sheer	  number	  of	  
leaders	   or	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   at	   least	   one	   member	   of	   the	   management	   committee	   was	   invited	   to	   the	  
training.	   Column	   4	   reports	   the	   effect	   of	   having	   invited	   at	   least	   one	   member	   of	   the	   management	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committee	  to	  the	  training.	  However,	  we	  find	  no	  clear	  effect	  for	  this	  binary	  variable.	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  
not	  all	  members	  of	  the	  management	  committee	  exercise	  the	  same	  influence	  over	  their	  fellow	  members.	  
The	  effect	  identified	  in	  column	  3	  could	  then	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  greater	  probability	  that	  the	  most	  influential	  
element	  in	  the	  group	  of	  leaders	  was	  invited	  to	  the	  training.	  For	  instance,	  one	  could	  expect	  that	  training	  
the	   chairman	   of	   an	   organization	   has	   more	   of	   an	   effect	   than	   training	   any	   other	   member	   of	   the	  
management	  committee.	  In	  our	  sample,	  the	  chairman	  was	  randomly	  selected	  for	  the	  training	  in	  8	  of	  the	  
22	  treatment	  organizations.	  In	  column	  5	  we	  thus	  test	  whether	  this	  affected	  collective	  commercialization	  
of	  non-­‐trainees	  beyond	  the	  effect	  of	  having	  trained	  at	  least	  one	  individual	  in	  the	  group	  and	  the	  number	  
of	  individuals	  invited.	  We	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  such	  effect.	  
	   Results	   from	  Table	   7	   thus	   indicate	   that	   training	   at	   least	   one	   individual	   of	   an	  organization	  had	  
clear	  effect	  on	  non-­‐trained	  individuals’	  willingness	  to	  sell	  through	  the	  group.	  Further,	  for	  a	  given	  number	  
of	   individuals	   invited	   to	   the	   training,	   the	  number	  of	  members	  of	   the	  management	   committee	   trained	  
positively	  affected	  collective	  commercialization	  while	  no	  such	  effect	  is	  found	  for	  having	  trained	  at	  least	  
one	   leader	   or	   having	   trained	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	   RPO.	   This	   result	   is	   robust	   to	   the	   simultaneous	  
introduction	  of	  all	   treatment	  variables	   in	  column	  6,	  showing	  that	  each	  additional	   leader	   invited	  to	  the	  
training	  implies	  an	  average	  increase	  of	  71	  kg	  of	  output	  commercialized	  through	  the	  organization	  by	  non-­‐
trained	  members.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  mere	  binary	  treatment	  effect	  identified	  in	  column	  1	  is	  
now	  not	  only	  smaller	  in	  magnitude	  but	  also	  no	  longer	  statistically	  significant.	  
	  
(iv) Robustness	  checks	  
	  
Results	   from	   Table	   7	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   number	   of	   leaders	   trained	   positively	   affects	   collective	  
commercialization	   by	   non-­‐trained	   members.	   One	   may	   argue,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	  
leadership	   position	   per	   se	   that	  matters	   and	   that	   results	  may	   reflect	   the	   fact	   that	   leaders	   tend	   to	   be	  
better	  connected	  within	  an	  organization	  –	  which	  may	  explain	  their	  leadership	  position	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  these	  results	  could	  merely	  reflect	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  connections	  of	  trainees,	  
in	  line	  with	  the	  model’s	  prediction	  that	  influence	  towards	  collective	  commercialization	  is	  mostly	  driven	  
by	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  effects.	  To	  investigate	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  we	  rely	  on	  data	  assessing	  the	  familiarity	  
of	   non-­‐trainees	   with	   trained	   individuals.	   In	   particular,	   our	   data	   enables	   us	   to	   assess,	   for	   each	   non-­‐
trainee,	  whether	  he	  or	  she	  had	  any	  familial	  relationship	  with	  each	  of	  the	  individuals	  trained	  and	  whether	  
he	  or	  she	  would	  trust	  the	  trainee	  to	  watch	  over	  his	  or	  her	  field	  if	  he	  or	  she	  had	  to	  leave	  the	  village	  for	  
two	  months.	   For	   each	  non-­‐trainee,	  we	  obtain	   indicators	  measuring	   the	  number	  of	   trained	   individuals	  
with	  whom	  the	  member	  has	  a	  family	  link	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  that	  he	  or	  she	  would	  trust	  watching	  over	  
her	  field.	  Results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  8	  and	  show	  no	  evidence	  of	  an	  effect	  of	  individual	  connections	  
beyond	  that	  of	  the	  binary	  treatment	  effect.	  	  
Finally,	   the	  effect	  on	   collective	   commercialization	  may	  be	  driven	  by	   the	   relative	  magnitude	  of	  
output.	  Non-­‐trainees	   contemplating	  whether	  or	  not	   to	   sell	   through	   the	  RPO	  could	  be	  affected	  by	   the	  
fact	   that	   large	  producers	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	   in	  such	  collective	  activities.	  This	  would	  positively	  affect	  
the	  probability	  of	   reaching	   a	   large	  enough	  quantity	  of	   aggregated	  output	   to	  obtain	   a	   significant	  price	  
premium.	  We	   include	   the	   largest	   landholding	   size	   as	  well	   as	   the	   total	   aggregated	   landholding	   size	   of	  
trainees	  and	  assess	  whether	  this	  affects	  the	  willingness	  of	  non-­‐trainees	  to	  sell	  their	  output	  through	  the	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organization.	   Results,	   presented	   in	   columns	   5	   and	   6	   of	   Table	   8,	   reveal	   that	   there	   is	   no	   influence	   of	  




In	  this	  paper,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  motivation	  of	  members	  and	  leaders	  and	  their	  internal	  coordination	  and	  
communication	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   RPOs	   to	   aggregate	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	  
produce	   from	   their	  members	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   possibly	   negotiate	   higher	  
prices	   for	   their	   members.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   adequate	   consideration	   of	   such	   coordination	   issues,	  
development	  interventions	  aimed	  at	  supporting	  RPOs	  may	  not	  fulfill	  their	  full	  potential.	  	  
Our	  theoretical	  model,	  an	  adaptation	  of	  a	  standard	  coordination	  game,	  predicts	  that	  a	  low	  level	  
of	   uncertainty	   about	   the	   actions	   and/or	   beliefs	   of	   others	   regarding	   one’s	   own	   actions	   can	   cause	   so-­‐
called	   strategic	  uncertainty,	  which	   leads	   to	  variations	   in	   the	   type	  of	  equilibrium	  that	   is	   reached.	   In	  an	  
RPO	  context,	  this	  means	  that	  changes	  in	  an	  individual’s	  beliefs	  concerning	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  other	  
members	   who	   are	   committed	   to	   sell	   through	   the	   organization	   may	   lead	   to	   large	   differences	   in	   the	  
amount	  of	  output	  aggregated	  for	  collective	  commercialization.	  	  
We	  have	  tested	  our	  model’s	  predictions	  using	  a	  sample	  of	  groundnut	  RPOs	  in	  Senegal.	  Our	  study	  
constitutes	   an	   RCT	  where	   our	   intervention	   consists	   of	   a	   three-­‐day	   training	   administered	   to	   randomly	  
selected	   organizations	   and	   randomly	   selected	  members	   and	   leaders	   in	   varying	   numbers.	   Using	   three	  
rounds	   of	   data	   (baseline,	   endline	   and	   groundnut	   commercialization	   data)	  we	   assess	   the	   effect	   of	   our	  
intervention	  on	  commercialization	  behavior	  of	  non-­‐trained	  farmers	  nine	  months	  after	  the	  training.	  
	  Although	   limited	   in	   power,	   our	   study	   generates	   interesting	   results.	   First,	   it	   suggests	   that	   our	  
intervention	  has	  significantly	  affected	  the	  quantity	  commercialized	  by	  members	  of	  the	  treatment	  group,	  
which	   is	   in	   line	  with	   our	   expectation	   that	   the	   training	   has	   altered	   the	   level	   of	  members’	   aversion	   to	  
strategic	  uncertainty.	  Second,	  we	  find	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  number	  of	  leaders	  who	  	  were	  
trained.	  However,	  we	  find	  no	  effect	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total	  number	  of	  members	  that	  were	  trained	  or	  
any	   evidence	   that	   training	   at	   least	   one	   leader,	   the	   chair,	   family	  members,	   trustworthy	   individuals	   or	  
larger	  farmers	  affects	  members’	  commitment	  to	  the	  organization	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  effect	  of	  having	  
at	  least	  one	  trained	  individual.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  leadership	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  responsibility	  
of	  a	  single	  individual	  as	  suggested	  implicitly	  in	  the	  literature.	  Rather,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  a	  sufficient	  
number	   of	   influential,	   informed	   and	   visible	   individuals	   may	   have	   more	   influence	   on	   the	   behavior	   of	  
regular	  members.	  	  
As	   we	   find	   no	   evidence	   that	   larger	   farmers	   or	   trusted	   individuals	   exert	   a	   larger	   influence	   on	  
commercialization	   behavior,	   our	   results	  may	   then	   in	   part	   be	   driven	   by	   a	   change	   in	   the	  motivation	   of	  
leaders	   themselves	   and	   thereby	   their	   willingness	   to	   orientate	   the	   RPO	   towards	   collective	  
commercialization.	  This	  effect	  may	  be	  reinforced	  if	  several	  leaders	  of	  a	  particular	  organization	  attended	  
the	   training.	   In	   this	   case,	   it	   is	   not	   so	   much	   that	   individuals	   expect	   that	   a	   larger	   quantity	   will	   be	  
aggregated	   but	   that	   the	   renewed	   motivation	   of	   leaders	   may	   affect	   results.	   While	   the	   operational	  
consequence	  of	  the	  findings	  remain	  unchanged	  –collective	  commercialization	  involves	  larger	  quantities	  
of	   groundnuts	   when	   several	   leaders	   are	   involved	   –	   the	   mechanisms	   at	   play	   need	   to	   be	   further	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Table	  1:	  Correlates	  of	  past	  collective	  commercialization	  behavior	  
Dependent:	  quantity	  of	  groundnut	  commercialized	  through	  RPO	  last	  year	  (kg)	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  
Strategic	  uncertainty	  
aversion	  
-­‐121.112	   	   	   	   -­‐111.412	  
(53.076)**	   	   	   	   (59.655)*	  
Risk	  aversion	   	   -­‐42.672	   	   	   -­‐17.436	  
	   	   (103.281)	   	   	   (107.936)	  
Preference	  for	  
present	  
	   	   -­‐0.001	   	   -­‐0.001	  
	   	   (0.001)*	   	   (0.001)	  
Altruism	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
other	  members	  
	   	   	   -­‐1.851	   -­‐1.414	  
	   	   	   (1.057)*	   (0.973)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Literate	   46.447	   44.632	   40.694	   44.523	   39.292	  
	   (56.168)	   (58.496)	   (53.163)	   (53.972)	   (54.993)	  
Male	   -­‐19.826	   -­‐24.633	   -­‐25.925	   -­‐26.493	   -­‐18.593	  
	   (69.388)	   (67.528)	   (71.377)	   (71.669)	   (65.892)	  
Age	   1.706	   2.161	   1.891	   2.324	   1.462	  
	   (2.651)	   (2.806)	   (2.542)	   (2.716)	   (2.562)	  
Land	  owned	  (ha)	   6.611	   6.437	   6.934	   6.011	   7.007	  
	   (4.650)	   (4.522)	   (4.699)	   (4.609)	   (4.542)	  
Leadership	  position	   244.788	   250.089	   253.448	   249.577	   239.825	  
	   (167.171)	   (177.977)	   (166.136)	   (166.785)	   (169.744)	  
Size	  of	  RPO	   28.645	   27.826	   28.251	   28.027	   28.291	  
	   (19.173)	   (19.860)	   (19.232)	   (19.102)	   (19.862)	  
Federation	  dummy	   -­‐59.065	   -­‐58.140	   -­‐58.276	   -­‐60.712	   -­‐59.695	  
	   (24.551)**	   (25.481)**	   (24.525)**	   (25.416)**	   (25.818)**	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   -­‐514.983	   -­‐495.848	   -­‐504.018	   -­‐408.350	   -­‐359.789	  
	   (564.538)	   (648.913)	   (557.126)	   (515.017)	   (600.198)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
R2	   0.26	   0.25	   0.26	   0.25	   0.27	  
N	   240	   240	   240	   239	   239	  
 	   	   	   	   	  
Note:	  OLS	  estimates.	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  group	  level	  in	  parentheses.	  	  
*	  p<0.1;	  **	  p<0.05;	  ***	  p<0.01	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Table	  4:	  Intended	  and	  actual	  organization-­‐level	  treatment	  
RPO	  
id	  
Intended	  treatment	   Actual	  treatment	  
to	   me	   le	   to	   me	   le	  
1	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
3	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
4	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
5	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
6	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   1	  
7	   1	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	  
8	   1	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	  
9	   2	   1	   1	   2	   0	   2	  
10	   2	   2	   0	   1	   1	   0	  
11	   3	   0	   3	   2	   0	   2	  
12	   3	   1	   2	   1	   1	   0	  
13	   3	   1	   2	   4	   1	   3	  
14	   3	   1	   2	   3	   2	   1	  
15	   3	   2	   1	   1	   1	   0	  
16	   3	   3	   0	   3	   3	   0	  
17	   4	   0	   4	   1	   0	   1	  
18	   4	   1	   3	   2	   2	   0	  
19	   4	   2	   2	   4	   2	   2	  
20	   4	   3	   1	   4	   3	   1	  
21	   5	   1	   4	   5	   1	   4	  
22	   5	   1	   4	   4	   2	   2	  
23	   5	   2	   3	   5	   2	   3	  
24	   5	   3	   2	   4	   3	   1	  
25	   6	   2	   4	   6	   2	   4	  
26	   6	   3	   3	   6	   3	   3	  





















	  #	  leaders	  
invited	  to	  
training	  
 (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Quantity	  commercialized	  
through	  RPO	  last	  year	  
149.59	   0.000	   -­‐0.000	   -­‐0.000	  
(446.62)	   (0.000)	   (0.001)	   (0.000)	  
Strategic	  uncertainty	  aversion	   0.15	   -­‐0.014	   -­‐0.704	   -­‐0.549	  
	   (0.36)	   (0.050)	   (0.473)	   (0.340)	  
Literate	   0.27	   -­‐0.007	   0.020	   -­‐0.095	  
	   (0.44)	   (0.062)	   (0.252)	   (0.193)	  
Male	   0.40	   -­‐0.037	   -­‐0.476	   -­‐0.347	  
	   (0.49)	   (0.080)	   (0.380)	   (0.280)	  
Age	   41.72	   0.001	   0.007	   -­‐0.001	  
	   (14.34)	   (0.001)	   (0.008)	   (0.007)	  
Land	  owned	  (ha)	   3.82	   -­‐0.010	   -­‐0.027	   -­‐0.017	  
	   (5.94)	   (0.005)*	   (0.023)	   (0.014)	  
Size	  of	  RPO	   31.15	   0.017	   0.014	   0.016	  
	   (4.33)	   (0.021)	   (0.098)	   (0.080)	  
Federation	  dummy	   5.82	   -­‐0.004	   0.052	   0.113	  
	   (3.49)	   (0.022)	   (0.116)	   (0.073)	  
Constant	   	   0.319	   2.322	   0.921	  
	   	   (0.633)	   (2.941)	   (2.389)	  
R2	   	   0.08	   0.07	   0.17	  
N	   240	   240	   240	   240	  
	   	   	   	   	  
 Note:	  OLS	  estimates.	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  group	  level	  in	  parentheses.	  	  























	   	  
	   Share	  of	  respondents	  with	  above	  
minimum	  possible	  level	  of	  aversion	  
to	  strategic	  uncertainty	  
Sample	   #	  obs.	   Baseline	   Endline	   Diff	  :	  p-­‐value	  
	   	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
A.	  Trainees	   64	   0.15	   0.00	   0.001	  
B.	  Non-­‐trainees	  in	  treatment	  group	   201	   0.14	   0.07	   0.013	  
C.	  Non-­‐trainees	  in	  control	  group	   39	   0.18	   0.13	   0.486	  
Diff	  A-­‐B:	  p-­‐value	   	   0.892	   0.0198	   	  
Diff	  B-­‐C:	  p-­‐value	   	   0.6340	   0.3276	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Table	  7.	  Treatment	  effects	  
Dependent:	  quantity	  commercialized	  through	  RPO	  -­‐	  endline	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
At	  least	  one	  individual	  
trained	  in	  RPO	  
137.410	   148.628	   148.109	   101.277	   119.470	   113.021	  
(76.470)*	   (106.144)	   (109.768)	   (115.155)	   (97.352)	   (112.303)	  
#	  individual	  trained	   	   -­‐3.013	   -­‐44.904	   -­‐17.078	   -­‐1.921	   -­‐44.174	  
	   (19.595)	   (27.805)	   (28.849)	   (18.601)	   (28.210)	  
#	  leaders	  trained	  	   	   	   73.967	   	   	   71.323	  
	   	   	   (36.234)*	   	   	   (33.777)**	  
At	  least	  one	  leader	  
trained	  
	   	   	   118.919	   	   15.638	  
	   	   	   (150.248)	   	   (137.074)	  
Chairman	  of	  RPO	  trained	   	   	   	   	   67.897	   67.250	  
	   	   	   	   (105.900)	   (99.850)	  
Constant	   440.639	   443.593	   475.436	   414.658	   422.056	   449.162	  
	   (308.661)	   (308.768)	   (298.405)	   (293.710)	   (317.526)	   (310.445)	  
R2	   0.14	   0.14	   0.18	   0.16	   0.15	   0.19	  
N	   240	   240	   240	   240	   240	   240	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Note:	  OLS	  estimates.	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  group	  level	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p<0.1;	  **	  p<0.05;	  ***	  p<0.01	  
All	  estimations	  include	  controls	  for	  quantity	  commercialized	  through	  the	  RPO	  in	  previous	  year,	  household	  head	  literacy	  status,	  age	  and	  
gender,	  total	  land	  under	  management,	  leadership	  status	  within	  the	  RPO,	  size	  of	  RPO	  and	  dummies	  for	  organization’s	  membership	  in	  
federations.	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Table	  8.	  Alternative	  treatments	  
Dependent:	  quantity	  commercialized	  through	  RPO	  -­‐	  endline	   	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
At	  least	  one	  individual	  
trained	  in	  RPO	  
150.364	   146.853	   98.098	   143.936	   151.208	   151.676	  
(71.856)**	   (67.060)**	   (89.484)	   (66.946)**	   (67.659)**	   (67.037)**	  
#	  individual	  trained	   -­‐2.876	   -­‐11.650	   -­‐2.781	   -­‐21.093	   -­‐5.909	   -­‐13.401	  
	   (12.612)	   (14.147)	   (12.438)	   (16.541)	   (14.905)	   (14.491)	  
At	  least	  one	  family	  
member	  trained	  
-­‐3.005	   	   	   	   	   	  
(43.656)	   	   	   	   	   	  
#	  family	  link	  with	  trainees	   	   15.862	   	   	   	   	  
	   (12.470)	   	   	   	   	  
At	  least	  one	  trustworthy	  
individual	  trained	  
	   	   55.334	   	   	   	  
	   	   (64.738)	   	   	   	  
#	  trainees	  with	  high	  trust	   	   	   	   24.964	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   (15.144)	   	   	  
Largest	  landholding	  
among	  trainees	  
	   	   	   	   0.624	   	  
	   	   	   	   (1.766)	   	  
Total	  landownership	  size	  
of	  trainees	  
	   	   	   	   	   4.437	  
	   	   	   	   	   (3.201)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Constant	   442.863	   445.405	   442.555	   428.564	   447.164	   466.956	  
	   (152.711)***	   (151.813)***	   (152.105)***	   (151.718)***	   (152.637)***	   (152.639)***	  
R2	   0.14	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	   0.14	   0.15	  
N	   240	   240	   240	   240	   240	   240	  
       
Note:	  OLS	  estimates.	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  group	  level	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p<0.1;	  **	  p<0.05;	  ***	  p<0.01 
All	  estimations	  include	  controls	  for	  quantity	  commercialized	  through	  the	  RPO	  in	  previous	  year,	  household	  head	  literacy	  status,	  
age	  and	  gender,	  total	  land	  under	  management,	  leadership	  status	  within	  the	  RPO,	  size	  of	  RPO	  and	  dummies	  for	  organization’s	  
membership	  in	  federations. 
	  
